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Introduction 
 
The formal recognition of gender, as a category of public law, has swept the world. In a 
time of rapid legal change, in both new constitutions and old, the public law of gender – 
and the contested norm of gender equality – is being constituted, legislated and regulated. 
Of 194 written constitutions around the world, almost all guaranteed equality in express 
terms; almost two-thirds entrench equality or nondiscrimination guaranteeson the basis of 
sex, and almost one-third make express reference to gender.1 Measures to ensure the                                                         
1 Numerical study based on formal constitutional texts, using three data points: Constitute Project 
(2015), https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en; UN Women, Constitutional 
Database(2013), http://constitutions.unwomen.org/; Oxford Constitutional Law, Constitutions of the 
World(2015), http://oxcon.ouplaw.com.proxy.bc.edu (all last accessed June 2015). We found, of 194 
constitutions, 117 constitutions had an equality guarantee and a reference to ‘sex’, 29 had an equality 
guarantee and a constitutional reference to both ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, and 23 had an equality guarantee and a 
reference to ‘gender’. In addition, many constitutions include a specific provision for nondiscrimination or 
equality or even ‘proactive measures’ in relation to gender, sex or women, in particular areas such as 
elections, work, maternity leave and nationality. For an illuminating coding of constitutions along ‘gender 
neutral’, ‘difference egalitarian’ and ‘difference maternal’ lines, see Priscilla Lambert and Druscilla 
L Scribner, ‘A Politics of Difference Versus a Politics of Equality: Do Constitutions Matter?’ 
(2009) 41 Comparative Politics 337 (systemically analysing the effect, especially of ‘difference’ 
constitutions, which carve out differential treatment for women for purported egalitarian or maternal 
purposes). 
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equal participation of women and men in political and public decision making have been 
introduced in one hundred states and constitutionally entrenched in fifteen.2 
With 5-10 constitutions due for design and redesign each year,3 new statutes being 
introduced to respond to gender-based disadvantages and harms, and attention to gender 
in forums of representation a “signifier of democratic credentials for countries 
transitioning from authoritarianism and/or conflict’,4 these extraordinary changes in the 
field of public law call for close analysis.  
 
It is no coincidence that many of these changes to the public law of gender post-date the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW’), adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979.5 Half of the world’s new constitutions 
have been drafted since 1974, with significant outside influence.6 Initiatives for ‘gender 
mainstreaming’ and ‘women’s empowerment’ have – at least formally – occupied 
international organizations since 1995,7 and influenced international sponsorship and 
advice on the public laws of individual states, particularly those in the Global South. 
While these gender-sensitive developments can be credited to the success of locally and 
globally networked women’s movements (and other gender-recognition or human 
equality-based movements),8 they are also the result of other transnational forces, 
including economic liberalization, by which countries revise their systems of governance 
in order to secure foreign approval and capital and/or a higher ranking of development.9                                                                                                                                                                      
 
2  Quota Project, Global Database of Quotas for Women (2015) www.quotaproject.org (last accessed June 
2015); see further Blanca Rodríguez-Ruiz and Ruth Rubio-Marín, ‘On Parity, Interdependence, and 
Women’s Democracy’ in Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez and Tsvi Kahana (eds), Feminist 
Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 188, 202. 
 
3 Russell on Tom Ginsburg (ed), Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
4 Blanca Rodriguez-Ruiz & Ruth Rubio-Martin, ‘On Parity, Interdependence, and Women's Democracy’, in 
Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives 188, 203  (Beverley Baines et al. eds., 2012). 
5 Note the Convention on Political Rights of Women 1950. 189 of 197 member states of the UN are states 
parties to CEDAW. The US is signatory only.  
6 Helena Alviar García, ‘Gender Structures and Constitutional Law’, in Gunter Frankenberg, Order from 
Transfer: Comparative Constitutional Design and Legal Culture (2013), x. 
7 Beijing Conference 
8 See, eg, Elizabeth Katz, Women's Involvement in International Constitution-Making, in Feminist 
Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives 204, 219  (Beverley Baines et al. eds., 2012). 
9 Kerry Rittich, ‘The Properties of Gender Equality’, in Philip Alston & Mary Robinson (eds), Human 
Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (2005) 87, 91-3; see further Gráinne De Búrca, 
Claire Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott (eds), Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance (2014). For a 
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The entanglement of these processes complicates the global efforts of gender advocates 
and calls for scholarly investigation in multiple locales. Our study includes the 
perspectives of constitutional, administrative and international lawyers, as well as 
historians, ethnographers and political scientists, to analyse critically these apparent 
accomplishments.  
 
Thus, with the worldwide sweep of these gender-equal or gender-cognizant, public laws, 
one question recurs – has this widespread legal reform led to real change? Women, in 
particular, continue to experience an array of gender-based harms: persistent, and well-
documented vulnerability to violence, including sexual violence, insecurity, and poverty; 
circumscribed access to education, property and credit; workplace disadvantage and 
harassment; greater involvement in household and care work, without material 
recognition; and a continued inability to access the political forums and public laws in 
which these problems have often been sidelined or misunderstood. While these problems 
may seem intractable for different reasons: culture, ideology, power, political economy – 
it is clear that law continues to constitute, or insulate, these various effects. Thus it is 
critical to understand and critique the operation of formal law as one aspect of the 
continuing gap between the advocacy of gender justice or equality and its substantive 
achievement. 
 
This volume brings international law together with domestic constitutional and statutory 
law to explore the dimensions of this gap and what is particular to the gender question. 
Three general explanations are common in each field. The first is a gap in enforcement: 
just as international law exists famously without a centralized enforcement mechanism, 
so too does domestic constitutional law lack the guarantee of enforcement, even, it might 
be argued, in systems with judicial review.10  The breach of a formal guarantee of gender 
equality, for example, may lack sanctions at both the international level (where, for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
discussion of the links between the ‘good governance’ project and gender equality, see Sharon Bessell’s 
chapter, below; Kate Wilkinson. 
10 Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, ‘Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law’, 
(2009) 122 Harvard Law Review 1791, 1822-1840. 
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example, the CEDAW Committee provides recommendations only)11 and at the 
domestic, constitutional level, where constitutional courts may decline to enforce 
contentious constitutional provisions in order to avoid the deep political contestations that 
will result.12 Of course, judicial enforcement is not the only function of formal law – it 
has expressive, coordinating and educative functions that all help to secure greater 
compliance. Moreover, the underenforcement of law by courts – where courts avoid 
direct enforcement with the expectation that other branches of government will tackle 
certain complex policy questions, such as those required to implement ‘positive’ 
obligations attached to rights to education or health care,13 can apply with particular force 
to gender equality. The thesis of this book is that aspects of the ‘gap’ explained by 
nonenforcement and underenforcement can generate productive insights when fields of 
international and public law are brought together.14 
 
The second is a gap in sincerity. International treaties, especially the foundational human 
rights covenants, have always attracted the criticism of window dressing, as states are 
free to ratify treaties without making any reforms in domestic law.15 A similar criticism 
has been made about the phenomenon of ‘sham constitutions’, whereby countries                                                         
11 See, e.g., Andrew Byrnes, ‘The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’ 
in Anne Hellum andHenriette Sinding Aasen (eds), Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, 
Regional, and National Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 25, 39–48 (noting the effectiveness 
of General Recommendations, as well as the very modest role of individual communications due to limited 
membership of the Optional Protocol). For recent analysis of the information-generating role of CEDAW, 
see Cosette Creamer and Beth A Simmons, ‘Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’ (draft paper, 2015, copy on file with 
author). 
 
12 Goldsmith and Levinson, above n 12, 1817 (describing comparable features of international and 
constitutional law, and using ‘public law’ as a common description of law for states). 
 
13 Lawrence Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Practice (Yale 
University Press, 2004) (describing the phenomenon of underenforcement with respect to the U.S. Supreme 
Court). 
 
14 Compare, e.g., Kristin A. Collins, ‘Deference and Deferral: Constitutional Structure and the Durability of 
Gender-Based Nationality Laws’, 73, with Vicki C. Jackson, ‘Feminisms and Constitutions’, 43, in this 
volume. 
 
15 Emilie M. Hafner‐Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of 
Empty Promises, (2005) 110 American Journal of Sociology,  
pp. 1373-1411 
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regularly violate the very rights that their constitutions purport to guarantee.16 While the 
challenge of sincerity is related to the previously described problem of enforcement, it 
exists independently as a denial of the normative force of the law, which cannot be 
explained on formal institutional grounds. This ‘performance gap’ in the formal law has 
been observed to occur more for some legal protections than others: gender is one such 
area, as is substantive equality more generally.17 
 
The third explanation for an observed gap in formal law and its effect on the ground is 
its coverage: both international law and constitutional law carve out a number of 
exceptions of application that can have a significant impact on gender. Most prominent in 
the gap in coverage is the public/private distinction, in which both international and 
public law are said to be concerned only with the regulation of the public sphere. This 
distinction is dealt with in more detail later in the section ‘Defining Public Law’, but it 
can be seen that, through reserving particular areas of law from constitutional reach, such 
as religious personal laws or customary law or private law more generally,18 or through 
permitting far-reaching reservations in international human rights law that do the same,19 
the application of public law has limited effect to challenge gendered disadvantage in the 
very spheres in which it is most heavily experienced and perpetuated. The question of 
coverage is also raised by the multiple layers of authority created by federalism and its 
special impact on issues of gender.20 
 
These explanations apply to each field: indeed, hypotheses of gaps have been made since 
the earliest legal realist insight of the distinction between the law in the books and the law                                                         
16 David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 Cal. L. Rev. 863 (2013). 
17 Ibid (noting differences in respect paid to, for example, death penalty prohibitions and economic and 
social rights). 
18 See chapters by Vijaya Nagarajan and Archana Pasharar, Greenfell. 
19 Document problem of reservations to CEDAW on religious and customary grounds. 
20 See, e.g., Louise Chappell, Deborah Brennan and Kim Rubenstein, ‘A Gender and Change Perspective 
on Intergovernmental Relations’ in Paul Kildea, Andrew Lynch and George Williams (eds), Tomorrow’s 
Federation: Reforming Australian Government (Federation Press, 2012) 228 (examining how federal–state 
relations have accommodated or obstructed the development of policy on violence against women and 
childcare); Judith Resnik, ‘Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s 
Multiple Ports of Entry’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1564, 1578 (analysing both local versus national, 
and domestic versus international, jurisdictional divides). 
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in action.21 They also explain both more, and less, than the coexistence of formal equality 
and substantive inequality. This volume extends enforcement, sincerity and coverage 
rationales in public and international law to give greater attention to their application 
to gender. 
 
*** 
 
This book defines the public law of gender as an analytical category in which to study 
law’s structuring of politics, governing and gender. This includes the role that gender 
plays in themes of representation and participation in both ‘government’ and 
‘governance’. The distinction between those terms is meant to highlight the different 
ways in which power has been and continues to express itself from the local to the global. 
We ask how ‘gender’ has engaged with those structures and concepts, and how these 
structures and concepts depend on or enlist gendered roles. These enquiries engage public 
law in national, international and transnational perspectives, and also the broad work of 
constitutional design and governance theory, including concerns coming under the 
headers of accountability, participation, transparency and rights. A focus on gender in the 
contested public sphere also invites a rethinking of judicial, legislative and executive 
processes under the traditional public law fields of constitutional and administrative 
law.  Feminism – and feminisms – provide the theoretical tools for this analysis, from 
which to analyse the category of ‘gender’, as well as other legal categorisations, such as 
the guarantee of equality, and the public/private distinction, which are detailed in the 
following sections. 
 
2.1 Defining Gender 
Gender is not ‘real or self-evident or in the nature of things’; 22 nonetheless, it is a 
powerful construct, based on perceived differences between the sexes, that has served to                                                         
21 Roscoe Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’ (1910) 44 American Law Review 12. 
 
22 See e.g., Joan Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category for Historical Analysis’ (1986) 91 American Historical 
Review 1053, 1067; note also the way gender is conceived by the CEDAW Committee as referring to 
‘socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and society’s social and cultural 
meaning for these biological differences resulting in hierarchical relationships between women and men 
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organise social relations and roles in various ways throughout the world. The use of 
‘gender’ as an analytical category, rather than as an essentialised identity or universal 
causal force, can help to uncover the pervasiveness of gender assumptions against various 
cultural backgrounds and histories.23 In this vein, this book draws on the core assumption 
of feminism – that an inequality experienced along gender lines must be subject to 
challenge. Such an assumption holds value for women, men and transgender persons, and 
the book deals with all three gendered identities, with most chapters canvassing the 
particular impacts on women that are caused by gendered laws and/or stereotypes and 
assumptions. Nonetheless, we take issue with certain United Nations policies that have 
been observed to ‘assume that “gender” is a synonym for women’. 24  One chapter 
interrogates the harm caused by formal rules of gender discrimination on men as 
fathers;25 others include perspectives that analyse gender-based harms on both women 
and on certain groups of men;26 and another chapter examines more completely the harm 
of gender-based assumptions on gender-variant persons.27 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and in the distribution of power and rights favoring men and disadvantaging women’: CEDAW Committee, 
General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of CEDAW 
(2010), UN Doc. CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2, para 5. 
 
23 Mary Hawkesworth, ‘Sex, Gender, and Sexuality: From Naturalized Presumption to Analytical 
Categories’ in GeorginaWaylen et al. (eds), Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics, 31 (Oxford 
University Press, 2013). For an important account of conservative opposition to the use of the gender 
category, see Sally Baden and Anne Marie Goetz, ‘Who Needs [Sex] When You Can Have [Gender]: 
Conflicting Discourses on Gender at Beijing’, 56 (1997) Feminist Review 3. 
 
24 See Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming in the United Nations’ 
(2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1, 14. Like Charlesworth, we recognise that this uncritical use of 
the gender category can miss the relational structure of gender-based harms and perpetuate stereotypes. It 
can also privilege heteronormativity; see Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity (Routledge Classics, 1990). For a thoroughgoing critique of the unity and exclusions of the 
category of ‘woman’ and its deployment in international human rights law, see Darren Rosenblum, ‘Unsex 
CEDAW, or What’s Wrong with Women’s Rights’ (2011) 20 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 98. 
 
25 Collins, above n 16, 73. 
 
26 Susan Harris Rimmer, ‘Gender, Governance and Defence of the Realm: Globalising Reforms in the 
Australian Defence Force’, 413; Louise Chappell, ‘Governing Victims’ Rights Redress and Gender Justice 
at the International Criminal Court’, 465, in this volume. 
 
27 See further Rohan Kapur and Kellin Kristofferson, ‘A Gender Critique of Accountability in Global 
Administrative Governance’, 514. 
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Despite this range, the bulk of the chapters deal with women – which is a reflection of the 
disproportionate harm to women caused by gendered laws and assumptions, on a sheer 
numbers basis: yet we acknowledge the heterogeneity of women’s interests and 
experiences. The chapters of this book therefore encompass the various experiences of 
women along different axes – such as race, class, age, disability, ethnicity, religion, 
sexual orientation, locality, geography and, critically, jurisdiction. Again, feminist theory 
provides important resources to understand the intersection of various inequalities and 
identity categories as well as gender.28 This focus on intersectionality is most suited to 
the book’s combined focus on the experience of women in both the Global South and 
North. For example, the following chapters are able to problematise the experience of a 
minority group, Muslim women in India, whose experience under the Indian Constitution 
is very different from that of Hindu women in India;29 and of aboriginal, Muslim and 
Mormon women in Canada, whose experience of living in polygamous relationships may 
be very different from the expectations of other women and men in Canada, and of each 
other;30 and of women’s organisers in Colombia, whose gendered disadvantage cannot be 
divorced from their experience of extreme poverty and insecurity.31 Gender may be a 
category that builds solidarity between women (and others), but it does not follow that 
the consequences of this category are the same across our sites of analysis. 
 
2.2 Defining Public Law  
Public law has a long history of supporting the ‘legalized subordination’ of women; as 
well as their invisibility. Public law is primarily concerned with the relationship between 
individuals and the state, and between the state and other government actors. This book                                                         
28 For presentation of these ideas, see Jackson, above n 16; see, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing 
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics’ [1989] University of Chicago Legal Forum 139, 159. 
 
29 For presentation of these ideas, see Jackson, above n 16; see, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing 
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics’ [1989] University of Chicago Legal Forum 139, 159. 
 
30 Beverley Baines, ‘Polygamy: Who Speaks for Women?’, 219, in this volume. 
 
31 Julieta Lemaitre and Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, ‘Structural Remedies and the One Million Pesos: On the 
Limits of Court-Ordered Social Change for Internally Displaced Women in Colombia’, 99, in this volume. 
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explores both explicitly gendered public laws, such as equality guarantees 
(predominantly expressed in relation to sex or gender32), as well as facially neutral public 
laws, that may help to sustain many disparities between men and women. Public laws are 
not formally concerned with the choices made and the actions between individuals, which 
are, in the main, governed by private law such as contract, property and tort; nonetheless, 
they influence these choices in critical ways.33 Moreover, a raft of antidiscrimination and 
accommodation statutes that reach into employment, for example, can be considered 
‘public law’, due to the state’s efforts to ensure that private relations are consistent with 
equality guarantees.34 While these distinctions are made differently in civil and common 
law systems, this book adopts the category of ‘public law’ as a heuristic to interrogate the 
international, constitutional and statutory laws applicable to the state and government but 
does not assume that they are wholly separate from private application, particularly when 
those relations are enforced through laws of contract, property or tort. We acknowledge, 
therefore, that ‘what is public in one society may well be private in another’.35  
Indeed, the challenge to the distinction between public and private spheres, so long 
fostered by feminist activism, has become integrated into some versions of public law. 
Many modern constitutions now recognise the ‘horizontal effect’ of public laws and 
require private individuals and groups to respect the constitutional rights and principles 
expressed in the public sphere.36 While the ‘state action’ doctrine in the United States and 
Canada, for instance, reserves the application of the Constitution to cases involving state-                                                        
32 See text accompanying above n 2. 
33 Frances E Olsen, ‘The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ 
(1983) 96 Harvard Law Review1497. 
 
 
34 Kirsty Gover, ‘Gender and Racial Discrimination in the Formation of Groups: Tribal and Liberal 
Approaches to Membership in Settler Societies’, 367; Dominique Allen, ‘Rethinking the Australian Model 
of Promoting Gender Equality’, 391, in this volume. 
 
35 Rebecca J Cook (ed), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 6 (citing comment by Hilary Charlesworth); see also the discussion in 
Rubenstein, ‘In Her Own Voice: Oral (Legal) History’s Insights on Gender and the Spheres of Public Law’, 
246, in this volume. 
 
36 See, e.g., Dawn Oliver and Jorg Fedtke (eds), Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative 
Study (Routledge,2009). 
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individual interactions, there is nevertheless scope in those jurisdictions to develop the 
common law indirectly, in line with constitutional principles.37 Elsewhere, private law is 
subject to the ‘radiating effect’ of the constitutional law, whereby courts are compelled to 
adhere to constitutional rights or values when applying private law.38 The jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights, in recognising the positive obligations of states 
to secure protections as between private parties, has also challenged conventional 
expectations of the divide between public and private law.39 As certain chapters suggest, 
the increasing recognition of positive obligations of gender equality, and other positive 
state duties, expands the reach of public law into private domains of subordination.40 
 
Moreover, the very shift from government to governance that is evident in other 
chapters41 signifies how various private, nonstate entities are now sourced to deliver 
services and perform other traditional state functions. Thus, at the same time as 
workplaces,42 militaries43 and other organisations must respect certain employment and 
criminal laws, the increasing number and range of public/private partnerships change the 
scope of public law. Accompanying this market-based challenge to the public/private 
distinction comes an assumption that the more ‘family-like’ an association or group, the 
                                                        
37 Helen Herschkoff, ‘“Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and 
Economic Rights’ (2010) 62 Stanford Law Review 1521; Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: 
Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton University 
Press, 2009) 198. 
 
38 See, e.g., Johan van der Walt, The Horizontal Effect Revolution and the Question of Sovereignty (De 
Gruyter, 2014). 
 
39 Oliver Gerstenberg, ‘Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement’ (2004) 10 European 
Law Journal771; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford University 
Press, 1993); Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
 
40 E.g., Jackson, above n 16; Allen, above n 38; and see generally the exchange on recognising a 
constitutional role for religious and customary law in the chapters in Part II. 
 
41 E.g., Bessell, above n 10; see further Jody Freeman, ‘The Private Role in Public Governance’ 
(2000) 75 NYU Law Review 543. 
 
42 Allen, above n 38. 
 
43 Harris Rimmer, above n 28. 
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less likely public laws should be able to access it.44 Yet this normative assumption, too, 
requires critical examination. How ‘family-like’ are indigenous communities in Western 
settler states,45 polygamous unions in multicultural states46 or traditional communities 
living under constitutionally prescribed customary law?47 Attempts to prohibit gender 
discrimination in these communities are complicated by exceptions carved out for 
religious freedom, cultural rights or privacy in the previously described coverage terms. 
 
The private sphere continues to be legally insulated in many parts of the world, and 
private subordination usually corresponds with subordination in the public sphere. As we 
shall see, public laws to end subordination may sometimes increase women’s experiences 
of subordination in the home and community.48Such dynamics are complicated by the 
public recognition of religious and customary laws, including trends in accommodation, 
access to courts, and the codification of custom.49 While this is not true for all places, the 
traditional feminist contestations between sameness and difference, or essentialism 
and pluralism, have very different political valences in such places.50 
 
2.3 From the Local to the Global    
This insight complicates the local/global frame that this book incorporates. While 
transcending boundaries has been a central trope of feminist analysis,51 the borders of  
states, and the sorting of regions (such as the Global North and the Global South, the core 
and the periphery, the developed and the developing world52), and the distinction 
                                                        
44 Gover, above n 38; Olsen, above n 37. 
 
45  Gover, above n 38. 
 
46 Baines, above n 32. 
 
47 Susan H Williams, ‘Customary Law, Constitutional Law and Women’s Equality’, 123, in this volume. 
 
48 Sari Kouvo and Corey Levine, ‘Law as a Placeholder for Change? Women’s Rights and Realities in 
Afghanistan’, 195, in this volume; see also Nicola Lacey, ‘Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of 
Women’ in Karen Knop(ed), Gender and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2004) 13–55. 
 
49  Williams, above n 51. 
50 Nagarajan and Parashar, above n 20. 
51 Martha Albertson Fineman, Transcending the Boundaries of Law: Generations of Feminism and Legal 
Theory (Routledge, 2011). 
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between domestic and international laws, maintain a powerful hold as categories of study. 
This book invites attention to the public law recognition of gender across all of these 
sites. Of course, this goal must be reflective of how the uneven effect of historical 
processes and ideologies (such as colonialism, racism and industrialisation), different 
religious and cultural morality and sexuality codes, and current geopolitical and 
economic power, continue to perpetuate differences – of both degree and kind – in the 
experience of gender inequality in various parts of the world. This book therefore 
proceeds with attention to the local as well as the global – exposing diverse conceptions 
of gender equity, gender equality, parity and other gender-cognisant laws in different 
sites. 
Attention to these processes requires an explicitly global/local perspective, which reviews 
the gender-related developments (and omissions) in subnational and transnational laws 
and their influence on domestic lawmaking and substantive laws. Certainly, the frame of 
human rights is one that is peculiarly suited to incorporating transnational, international 
and national laws and interactions.53 Constitutions that incorporate international law 
directly also prompt an inclusive study.54 The following chapters broaden the perspective 
of comparative constitutional law and human rights by highlighting what is captured by a 
gendered analysis when fields of international and public law are brought together. These 
include the usual areas in which a global perspective is taken, but that impact on gender                                                                                                                                                                      
52 Eg Loveday Hodson, Women's Rights and the Periphery: CEDAW’s Optional Protocol, 25 Eur. J. Int'l L. 
561 (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 561; D Bonilla Maldonado (ed), Constitutionalism 
of the Global South (Cambridge University Press, 2013)(presenting India, South Africa and Colombia as 
case studies that illustrate post-colonial constitutionalism, while not seeking to carve out a comprehensive 
and distinctive framework for a constitutionalist approach of the Global South); see 
also Penelope Andrews, From Cape Town to Kabul: Rethinking Strategies for Pursuing Women’s Human 
Rights (Ashgate, 2012) 19, 80 (rejecting a monolithic ‘us’ and a monolithic ‘them’ while suggesting that 
non-elite women from the Global South may have more in common with each other than with elites in the 
South and women in the North). 
 
 
53 E.g., Knop (ed), above n 52; Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating 
International Law into Local Justice (University of Chicago Press, 2006); Cook (ed), above n 39. 
 
54 This interplay is illustrated well by Vicki Jackson’s bookended chapters in this volume: compare 
Jackson, ‘Feminisms and Constitutions’, above n 16, with Jackson, ‘Feminisms, Pluralism and 
Transnationalism: On CEDAW and National Constitutions’, 437, later in this volume. For example, 
Argentina’s Constitution not only recognises the force of international law, but expressly names CEDAW, 
along with other human rights conventions, in its text: Article 75(22). 
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in sometimes unexpected ways (human rights, migration, international economic law and 
international criminal law), as well as other highly visible areas of globalised law and 
their less commented-upon impact on gender (post-conflict constitutions, environmental 
law, governance and development), to less visible areas of globalised law and their 
impact on gender (family law and polygamy, poverty measurement, employment law in 
international organisations and military law). 
 
3 Intersecting Observations on Public Law 
 
This book is situated in a number of intersecting literatures. While the study of the 
configuration of gender in public law – and the exclusion of women from the very origins 
of the state – has been a vigorous one in particular domestic contexts,55 this book also 
stands on the shoulders of a number of recent works in comparative constitutional law 
that have drawn attention both to the distinctive treatments of gender in comparative 
constitutional jurisprudence56 and the importance of gender categories in constitutional 
design.57 These studies have challenged the gendered nature of constitutional principles, 
including the traditional sidelining of central issues of concern for women, such as 
reproductive rights, economic and social rights, the regulation of group rights of 
minorities as core principles and the traditional liberal distinction between public and 
private realms.58 
 
                                                        
55 See, e.g., Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (first published 1790, 1998 
ed); CatharineMacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University 
Press, 1989); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract(Stanford University Press, 1988). 
 
56 Beverley Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marín (eds), The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence (Cambridge 
University Press,2005); Baines et al. (eds), above n 3. 
 
57 Williams (ed), above n 5; Helen Irving, Gender and the Constitution: Equity and Agency in Comparative 
Constitutional Design (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Paula A Monopoli, ‘Gender and Constitutional 
Design’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 2643; see also Linda C McClain and Joanna 
L Grossman (eds), Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal Citizenship (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
 
58 E.g., Baines and Rubio-Marín, above n 60. 
 
Early draft June 1, 2015. Please do note cite or circulate.  
 13 
These works expand the accelerating field of comparative constitutional law,59 and its 
attention to the migration of public law ideas across the world.3260 Gender equality is one 
such idea, and has taken flight along with many of the same processes of borrowing and 
transplants that have been germane to other trends.61 It is clear that networks of 
transnational women’s and human rights activists have been important agents for these 
migrations,62 in ways that may be quite distinct from the ensemble of constitutional ideas 
understood as ‘generic’ constitutional law.63As a historical matter, efforts to challenge 
the configuration of gender roles have often involved an appeal beyond the nation-state, 
with opponents coining their arguments in terms of the ‘jurisdictional proprietary of 
leaving issues of gender to the nation-state’.64 At this juncture, the insights learned from 
feminist approaches to international law help to clarify what is particularly 
untransplantable about such norms, as opposed to other human rights. 
 
Indeed, recent empirical studies of state lawmaking suggest that the recognition of 
women’s rights (post the initial stage by early adopters of women’s suffrage) correlates 
less with domestic political conditions than with international ‘contagion’ effects.65 Non-
conformist states ‘joined the bandwagon’ against domestic violence, for example, 
‘despite dramatic differences in women’s political power or access to economic resources                                                         
59 Tom Ginsburg (ed), Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Tom 
Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds), Comparative Constitutional Law (2011); Sujit Choudry, Constitutional 
Design in Divided Societies (Oxford University Press, 2008),  
 
60 Sujit Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (2006); Frankenberg, above. 
61 Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford University Press, 2009). Vlad 
Perju, Transplants 
62 Catherine Eschle, Making Feminist Sense of the Global Justice Movement (Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2010); Sarah Henderson and Alana S. Jeydel, Women and Politics in a Global World (Oxford 
University Press, 2d ed, 2010); and Shirin M. Rai and Georgina Waylen, Global Governance: Feminist 
Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillian, 2008). 
63 David Law, ‘Generic Constitutional Law’ (2005) 89 Minnesota Law Review 652; see 
also Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and BethSimmons, ‘Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, 
Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice’ (2013) 54 Harvard Journal of International 
Law 61. 
 
64 Resnik, above n 22, 1589 (citing Elizabeth Maddock Dillon, The Gender of Freedom: Fictions of 
Liberalism and the Literary Public Sphere (Stanford University Press, 2004), but also noting that no single 
level – ‘the international, the transnational, the national, or the local – can be an ongoing source of any 
particular political stance’: at 1670). 
 
65 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International Law 
(2013).  
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at the national level’.66 Others inquire into how active women’s movements during 
periods of transition have been ‘unable to translate the importance of their activism ... 
into greater gains in the immediate post-transition period’.67 These dynamics reveal stark 
questions about whether women’s power and women’s preferences have now surfaced in 
these places or have instead been coopted and sidelined by the global ‘gender agenda’. 
 
 
The question of origins has been posed explicitly by legal scholars critical of the rise of 
‘governance feminism’.68 Tracking the apparent increase of influence by women’s rights 
advocates within the international lawmaking field, these scholars have together explored 
the suggestion that ‘feminism rules’ and has become responsible as a ‘wielder of power’ 
in governance.69 Under this lens, they describe a new feminist influence in lawmaking 
processes, such as the drafting of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court(the Rome Statute) and its successful incorporation of rape as an international 
crime.70 Yet while the accomplishments of governance feminism may be seen as a gain 
for women, the regime’s focus on crime, punishment and victims also counts as a loss in 
terms of what forms of women’s agency are excluded or denied. Indeed, these authors 
suggest that recent international successes for women have privileged only certain 
‘variants’ of feminism – ‘carceral’ feminism (with an undue focus on criminalisation), 
radical feminism (with an undue focus on subordination) and liberal feminism (with 
Western imperial overtones and a blindness to power).71                                                         
66 Goodman and Jinks, above n 69, 66–7 (reflecting on the convergence of women’s rights). 
 
67 Georgina Waylen, ‘Gendered Institutionalist Analysis: Understanding Democratic Transitions’ in Mona 
Lena Krook and FionaMackay (eds), Gender, Politics and Institutions: Towards a Feminist 
Institutionalism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 147, 154–6 (citing the Chilean case as an example of this 
phenomenon before applying it to eight other transitions). 
 
68 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir and Chantal Thomas, ‘From the International to the Local 
in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in 
Contemporary Governance Feminism’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Gender and Law 335. 
 
69  Janet Halley, ‘Taking a Break from Feminism’ in Knop (ed), above n 52, 57, 65 
 
70 Janet Halley, ‘Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in 
Positive International Criminal Law’, 30 (2008) Michigan Journal of International Law 1. 
 
71 Janet Halley et al., ‘Introduction’, in Governance Feminism (forthcoming) (copy on file with author). 
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Claims of ‘governance feminism’ have generated healthy reflection within feminist 
approaches to international law;72 while welcome, however, some of the most pointed 
criticisms of those writing against ‘governance feminism’ (such as those relating to the 
excessive focus on criminalisation and undue spotlight given to sex trafficking in 
international law) have been too particular to describe the whole of international 
lawmaking, in which feminist power is in short supply.73 Moreover, these and other 
criticisms of the missteps and unintended consequences of gender advocacy are, 
regrettably, not new.74 Certainly, the goal of gender equality has been coopted by various 
other projects – nationalism,75 socialism76 and most pressing now, neoliberalism and 
securitisation.77 The authors of this book give pause to any sense of feminist ‘triumph’ in 
international and public lawmaking. Yet our critical understandings of the attendant 
failures rest on different conclusions: the feminist, humanist or equality-based ideals 
pursued by such advocates should be open to self-reflection, not abandonment.78 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
72 E.g., Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Talking to Ourselves? Feminist Scholarship in International Law’ 
in Sari Kouvo and Zoe Pearson (eds),Feminist Perspectives on Contemporary International 
Law (Hart, 2011) 17. 
 
73 Otto, above n 66. 
 
74 E.g., Ratna Kapur, ‘Travel Plans: Border Crossings and the Rights of Transnational Migrants’ 
(2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 107, 113 (describing one part of the anti–sex trafficking 
movement’s ‘targeting of migration from the south, promotion of a highly conservative moral agenda, and 
a denial to sex workers and other migrants of their right to work, family, and mobility’); Resnik, above n 
22, 1660–6 (noting the exportation of American antiprostitution policy). 
 
75 E.g., Crenshaw, above n 30, 162, citing Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and Nationalism in the Third 
World (Third World,1986). 
 
76 Huong Nguyen, ‘Equality Without Freedom? Political Representation and Participation of Women in 
Vietnam’, 318, in this volume. 
 
77 Bessell, above n 10, 273; see also Penny Griffin, ‘Gender, Governance and the Global Political 
Economy’ (2010) 64 Australian Journal of International Affairs 86. 
 
78 Examples include Nagarajan and Parashar’s exhortation for self-reflexivity, above n 20, 171, 179; 
Jackson’s endorsement of feminist pluralism, above n 58, 437; and the evaluative perspective taken by 
Kouvo and Levine, above n 52, 216. 
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Outline 
 
We have divided the book into six parts, reflecting different aspects of the interaction 
between public law and gender, as well as different diagnoses and solutions to the 
problem of gender inequality. Thus we travel from issues of constitutional law and 
comparative constitutional design, to a study of participation and voice through law, and 
then to an interrogation of governance laws, including representation and gendered 
measures, and equality and non-discrimination. Finally, we turn to the public laws that 
operate at the level of global governance.  
 
In order of appearance, these chapters encompass the constitutions and other public laws 
of the U.S., Colombia, South Sudan, India, Vanuatu, South Africa, Timor-Leste, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Canada, Malawi, New Zealand, Vietnam, and Australia. These 
chapters deliberately expand our analysis from the ‘usual suspects’ of comparative 
constitutional study.79 The final part of the book deals more explicitly with various 
transnational and international sites of laws and lawmaking, such as in the CEDAW 
Committee, the International Criminal Court, the International Labour Organization, and 
the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. , It will be clear that global-
local interactions pervade every aspect of this study.  
 
PART I CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND GENDERED OUTCOMES 
 
The application of feminist insight into constitutional design is complex: even with 
agreed-upon conceptions of gender equality, there is no, single right way to order and 
reorder constitutions to fulfill these conceptions. Adopting a perspective useful for 
different constitutional polities only complicates this further. The three chapters in this 
part interrogate how framework issues of constitutional design contribute to, and 
constrain, gendered outcomes. These framework issues include equality rights – equality                                                         
79 Ran Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2014)4 (noting overlooked regions, including Sub-Saharan Africa to Central and 
Southeast Asia). 
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before the law, non-discrimination on the basis of sex and gender, and more substantive 
ideas of gender equality. Moreover, a host of structural and institutional design features, 
that include gender ‘agnostic’ (facially neutral) and gender ‘cognizant’ prescriptions, can 
drive particular gender outcomes. These findings are elicited in ways that utilize the idea 
of a ‘gendered constitutional audit’,80 to include analysis of how more general structural 
issues, such as access to court, or court-government relations, may configure particular 
gender outcomes. 
 
In her opening chapter on ‘Feminisms and Constitutions’, Vicki Jackson draws on both 
new and traditional ideas of constitutional design to outline a range of features that 
constitutions might have, in order to reflect ‘feminist’ or ‘gender-equal’ aspirations and 
outcomes.81 Rather than suggesting a single, right, feminist, answer, Jackson is sensitive 
to the plural, diverse and contingent effects of (varied) feminist thinking in (varied) 
constitutional contexts. Thus, she emphasizes certain process conditions for 
constitutional design or constitutional reform, including the relatively equal involvement 
of women and men, from different sectors of life, geography, occupation, ethnic or 
religious affiliation, and class; a process informed by a recognition of the need to address 
persistent “gendered disadvantages to both men and women, but on the whole more to 
women”.82 
 
Such a process, Jackson suggests, might benefit from the consideration of a range of 
constitutional features and their impact on gender. Most obvious, she suggests, is the 
inclusion of rights – to equality, to non-discrimination, to affirmative measures and to 
economic and social rights such as health (including reproductive health), education and 
non-violence. Rights, she notes, do not only belong in the realm of what is prohibited on 
the part of government; they may also raise the question of what is permitted and what is 
required. The extension of positive duties on the part of the state – including into the                                                         
80 Irving, above n 61, 13, 167 (making the historical note, too, that ‘gender auditing a constitution is hardly 
a new idea’). 
 
81 Jackson, above n 16. 
 
82 Ibid, 43. 
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private realm - is a fundamental question in contemporary constitutional theory and 
reflects particularly on gender outcomes. For example, how such positive duties are 
framed without perpetuations of stereotypes or the elicitation of backlash is a challenging 
issue, and one that is resolved very differently in various gender-equal constitutions. 
 
A particularly striking suggestion made in this vein is Jackson’s idea of a constitutional 
ban on patriarchy: a constitutional provision that would leave room for interpretive 
development, and extend current prohibitions on discrimination into other invidious 
private social practices of oppression and subordination, much like a ban on slavery in 
the U.S. Constitution, or untouchability in the Indian Constitution. This intriguing 
suggestion reflects Jackson’s view of constitutions as laws made for the long term; as 
well as her nuanced view of constitutional language. Other points of focus include voting 
rights and their exercise, the representation of women in government, legislative voting 
and rules, as well as constitutional-structure questions relating to executive and 
legislative power, federalism, consociations, enforcement, forms of constitutional 
engagement with international law, and indeed the very rules of constitutional 
amendment, which each configure certain gender outcomes in identified – and under-
identified – ways.  
 
Each of these questions of constitutional-structure is worthy of a more focused study: and 
indeed, this is what Kristin Collins is able to do in her analysis of enforcement and 
underenforcement in the context of gender equality in U.S. nationality law.83 This 
revealing chapter explores the continued gender asymmetries in federal citizenship 
statutes, which draw a distinction between the fathers and mothers of children born 
abroad whose parents are unmarried: while American mothers can secure citizenship for 
their children, American fathers are limited in their ability to do so. A practice now 
reversed by at least eight constitutional courts around the world (and by the prompting of 
some legislatures),84such laws reinforce gender-traditional parental roles while at the 
same time encumbering both caretaker fathers and their non-marital children.                                                         
83 Collins, above n 16, 73. 
 
84 Ibid.  
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That these facially discriminatory laws have continued shows how the apparently robust 
system of American gender equality laws may nevertheless run aground. Collins is able 
to reveal how this is done through the gender-neutral ‘plenary powers’ doctrine, which 
maintains that the ‘sovereign’ power to exclude aliens is one reserved for the political 
branches. This doctrine undergirds the practice of judicial deference in such contexts, 
creating political branch supremacy in a constitutional culture usually recognized in the 
world for its vigorous practice of judicial review. 
 
Moreover, what makes Collins’ focus so illuminating is that she analyzes, not how this 
doctrine has constrained courts, but rather how it has shaped Congress’s response to the 
practice of gender discrimination in federal nationality statutes. Indeed, she shows how a 
practice of deference has both prompted legislative efforts for reform and has seriously 
undermined them. Judicial deference, undertaken against a background of strong judicial 
review, has created what Collins terms ‘a cycle of deferral’ of the issue: giving the 
court’s constitutional imprimatur to gender and illegitimacy-based discrimination in the 
field of nationality laws, and stalling reformist efforts in Congress. Such inter-branch 
effects are a reminder of how such institutional arrangements shape gender laws, even as 
they may play out differently in other constitutional systems. 
 
An instructive mirror to Collins’ focus on the U.S. is Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Julieta 
Lemaitre’s analysis of the constitutional backdrop of institutional questions in 
Colombia,85 in particular the interactions established between the Colombian 
Constitutional Court and the internally displaced women’s league, the Liga de Mujeres 
Desplazadas. In the context of massive displacements of people from peasant farms into 
cities, including a disproportionate number of women, during Colombia’s protracted 
internal conflict, the Liga have mobilized to secure a baseline of security for such 
women, including through structural litigation in the Court. 
                                                         
85 Lemaitre and Sandvik, above n 33, 99. 
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This context has been supported by a number of design features of Colombia’s 1991 
Constitution: the newly created Constitutional Court itself and the availability of a tutela 
action with an expedited procedure for human rights complaints; later the declaration of 
an “unconstitutional state of affairs” which allowed for highly-interventionist court-
ordered reforms, as well follow-up hearings and awards. These creative remedies 
extended to the gender-specific risks faced by internally displaced persons, such as sexual 
violence, enslavement for domestic services, and other special vulnerabilities. 
 
Sandvik and Lemaitre recount how the Court’s robust interventions in this field have 
been prompted and supported by NGOs, including the Liga. Itself recognized as a ‘best 
practices’ organization amongst international funders and observers, the Liga has pursued 
the court and the government for every possible material benefit for its members, 
including humanitarian aid and poverty alleviation. Nonetheless, in a country with one of 
the world’s highest levels of inequality, and the ongoing aftershocks of conflict and 
violence, these public law remedies have proved unstable, corruptible and insufficient. 
Thus, although this chapter reveals the effectiveness of certain (gender-neutral) laws 
utilized by a mobilized grassroots organization and an innovative court, it concludes the 
limitations of constitutional design within an overarching setting of poverty and 
inequality.86 These telling conclusions for public law introduce themes canvassed in the 
next part. 
 
PART II CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN A GLOBAL SETTING: THE 
CHALLENGE OF THE LOCAL 
 
While constitutional design appears to be a framework issue for the structuring of gender 
equality, it must contend with the challenge of gaining traction. These four chapters 
document the contending attempts of achieving both a universal and local reach by 
constitutional design, particular through the challenge of realizing gender equality in the 
context of customary laws and religious personal laws that may ascribe particularly rigid                                                         
86 Compare with, eg, Muna Ndulo, African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights, 18 Ind. J. 
Global Legal Stud. 87, 92 (2011) (recommending a focus on reformist “courts and mass movements”). 
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and/or subordinated gender roles. In such cases, local laws may appear impervious to 
global intervention: yet local customs, for example, have already been distorted and 
rigidified by international processes of colonialism, even in remote and rural areas.87  
Moreover, states that endeavor to accommodate legal pluralism are often the most 
heavily globalized, by the postcolonial or post-conflict interventions of other states and 
international organizations.88 This is the case of South Sudan, Afghanistan, South Africa, 
Timor-Leste (East Timor), Kosovo, India and the Pacific state of Vanuatu, analyzed 
below. 
  
Susan Williams first takes the reader to newly independent South Sudan, where she acted 
as a constitutional adviser for the Transitional Constitution of 2011.89 In this context, the 
conflict between customary law and gender equality is patent; nonetheless, the 
Constitution formally marks out protection for both norms: the ‘equal protection of the 
law without discrimination as to … sex’ is guaranteed, as is the equal dignity of women, 
their equal pay for equal work, and their right to participate fully in public life, including 
through gender quotas. At the same time, the Constitution requires culture to be 
protected, preserved and promoted, although only consistently with the dignity and status 
of women. Williams interrogates the extent of this protection in the context of the vast 
apparatus of traditional courts operating in the country, and the significant procedural and 
substantive effects of exclusion and discrimination against women in customary law 
systems. 
 
To analyze this problem, Williams draws on feminist theorist Nancy Fraser and her 
framework of theorizing the distinct harms to gender justice raised by problems of                                                         
87 Ibid; Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels and Annelise Riles, ‘From Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, 
Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style’ (2012) 64 Stanford Law Review 589, 618 (referring to the 
‘aftershocks of a colonial legacy’). For extensive documentation of constitutional and statutory provisions 
protective of custom, see Katrina Cuskelly, ‘Customs and Constitutions: State Recognition of Customary 
Law Around the World’ (International Union for Conservation of Nature, 
2011), https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/documents/2011-101.pdf (last visited 15 June 2015). 
 
88 For a study of the latter, see Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Dina Francesca Haynes and Naomi Cahn, On the 
Frontlines: Gender, War, and the Post-Conflict Process (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 
89 Williams, above n 51. 
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recognition, redistribution and representation. Exploring these ‘various and cross-cutting 
forms of injustice at multiple levels’ through Fraser’s tight analytical edifice allows 
Williams to perceive the limits, but also the fruitful directions, of constitutional reform. 
In particular, she is able to show how giving priority to issues of representation – through 
gender quotas in the legislature, for example – need not (and should not) distract from 
attention to the cultural and material interventions that are required. Moreover, Williams 
extends Fraser’s analysis by focusing on the subnational sphere that is so influential for 
the lived experience of South Sudanese women.   
 
This application reveals interesting reform proposals, in the form of constitutional 
mechanisms that will encourage adaptability and responsiveness in customary law; and 
that will strengthen women’s roles in those systems. For example, Williams proposes to 
end the practice of codifying customary law in South Sudan, and to alternatively 
encourage (and materially support) a form of common law decision making, through 
recording and disseminating customary judgments. One question that remains is how 
such a proposal can be sure to further, rather than obstruct, gender equality goals in light 
of certain conservative tendencies of common law reasoning;90 Williams’ second 
proposal, for increasing women’s own influence in customary law systems, would seem 
to be a precondition (or even a substitute) of the first. 
 
Laura Grenfell’s chapter identifies the same problematic: of the formal constitutional 
recognition of gender equality operating against the backdrop of significantly unequal 
customary law.91 Taking post-conflict constitutions as her field of analysis, Grenfell 
outlines the drafting experience leading up to South Africa’s 1996 Constitution, Timor-
Leste’s 2002 Constitution, Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution, and Kosovo’s 2008 
Constitution. The participation of women’s group has been uneven, despite the 
exhortation of the United Nations: the most recent process, in Kosovo, included few local 
women. In the other three contexts, women agitated strongly to require that customary                                                         
90 Compare with Tracy Robinson, ‘Gender, Nation and the Common Law Constitution’, (2008) 28 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 735, 760. 
91 Grenfell, above n 20. 
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laws must operate in conformity with constitutional principles, and were partly 
successful. 
 
Nonetheless, Grenfell suggests that the interaction between constitutional equality and 
customary laws remains unclear. South Africa’s Constitution has proved the most 
robustly protective of gender equality, through Constitutional Court support for an 
evolving customary law, in which women can participate. Nonetheless, the recent support 
of the ANC given to traditional leaders suggests how precarious this settlement may be. 
In Timor-Leste, limited institutional support for gender equality is reflected in both the 
legislature and the courts, and gender-discriminating customary laws continue to operate. 
In Afghanistan, the situation is complicated by the constitutional recognition of both 
formal equality and the preeminence of Islamic law. Despite the highly divergent 
background systems of law operating in her chosen case studies, Grenfell combines these 
experiences to recommend a more explicit demarcation between gender equality and 
customary laws (and the priority of the former) in constitutional drafting. One may 
question the choice of such distinct comparators under the post-conflict theme; but it is 
clear than in such cases, certain traditional practices have been destabilized, and the 
moment of seeking equality based reforms for previously excluded groups may be a very 
narrow one. 
 
Further attention is given to these different settings in the following two chapters, 
focusing on India and Vanuatu, on the one hand, and Afghanistan again, on the other. For 
Vijaya Nagarajan and Archana Parashar, in their chapter on constitutional equality in 
India and Vanuatu,92 an explicit demarcation between constitutional and customary law 
will only get one so far. They contextualize each constitutional system, not by variables 
of political cultures or institutions or economies, but by their drafting origins and 
ideologies:93 from India’s postcolonial constitutional moment of 1950, equality has been                                                         
92 Nagarajan and Parashar, above n 20, 179. 
 
93 For recent evidence that suggests constitutions reflect not merely processes of internal development, but 
‘legitimating ideas dominant in the world system at the time of their creation’, see Goodman and Jinks, 
above n 69, 65, confirming a conclusion observed originally with respect to childhood and children’s 
rights: John Boli-Bennett andJohn Meyer, ‘The Ideology of Childhood and the State: Rules Distinguishing 
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given priority while nevertheless allowing for the accommodation of difference in 
religious personal laws. Vanuatu’s Constitution of 1980, on the other hand, forged during 
a postmodern retreat from universals, sought to simultaneously support equality and 
custom in land ownership.  
 
As Nagarajan and Parashar emphasize, these encounters with modernity have been 
further promoted by each state’s membership to CEDAW (in India in 1993, in Vanuatu in 
1995), and its attempt to set universal standards of equal rights for men and women. 
Nonetheless, in each system, the accommodation of difference portends unexamined 
disadvantages for particularly situated women. In India, minority women living under 
Muslim religious personal laws continue to experience lesser rights than Muslim men. In 
Vanuatu, women living under customary laws are excluded from making decisions about 
land, which particularly affects rural women. 
 
These outcomes suggest, for Nagarajan and Parashar, a different tilt to the sameness-
difference, and essentialism-pluralism debates in feminist theory: the acknowledgement 
that scholarly positions which may appear non-essentialist and non-imperial may actually 
ratify a great burden for particularly situated women. Their caution: that ‘cultural 
specifies in domestic and local contexts could become proxy justifications for leaving the 
current practices un-examinable in the name of non-imposition of top down norms’94 is a 
pressing challenge for scholars contributing to insights in the public law of gender. 
 
For Sari Kouvo and Corey Levine, who explore women’s rights and realities in 
Afghanistan, the message is a related one: an impressive ‘success on paper’,95 with the 
Constitution of 2004 entrenching equality between women and men, including a quota on 
women in both houses of Parliament, legislation on the elimination of violence against 
women in 2009, (internationally funded) prosecutions, membership of CEDAW, and                                                                                                                                                                      
Children in National Constitutions’ (1978) 43 American Sociological Review 797, 805; see also Nagarajan 
and Parashar, above n 20, 194. 
 
94 Nagarajan and Parashar, above n 20, 179. 
 
95 Kouvo and Levine, above n 52, 196. 
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gender sensitivity in development policy; combined with some of the worst barometers 
for gender equality, female social inclusion, and levels of gender violence, in any part of 
the world.  
 
The disconnect is not, of course, unusual in post-conflict states, where institutions may be 
weak and the rule of law may be fragile. Yet in such contexts, suggest Kouvo and Levine, 
equality-based laws and policies are nevertheless important: they operate as placeholders 
for the change that may come: ‘it would be worse for women’,96 for example, if the 
Constitution contained no such provision for equality. Nonetheless, Kouvo uses 
interviews to assess the realities that dominate and frame women’s lives on the ground: 
these point to the private sphere (which are homologous, Kouvo contends, for the 
educated women of Kabul and Herat, just as for those living in rural communities). The 
public/private distinction, so relevant in feminist theory, continues to hold its grip on the 
ineffectiveness of public law to unsettle the inequalities experienced in the private sphere, 
which includes the home but also, to an important degree, the community in which 
women live. In this complicated setting, while respect in the private sphere may translate 
to the public sphere, the same may not be true in the reverse: successful interventions in 
the public sphere may attract private repercussions, and are not based on solidarity 
networks between women. This set of findings opens the book up to its the next focus, on 
participation.  
 
PART III LOCALISING PARTICIPATION AND VOICE THROUGH LAW 
 
Participation, as an ideal of democratic theory, may have a protective function; yet it does 
not follow that all people should, therefore, participate; nor does it suggest the forms that 
participation should take.97 This section examines the gendered dimensions of that 
prescription and its critique, across domestic and international settings. Some recent                                                         
96 Ibid.  
97 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1970); For the 
examination of participation in constitution-making, 
see Alexandra Dobrowoksly and Vivien Hart (eds), Women Making Constitutions(Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004). 
 
 
Early draft June 1, 2015. Please do note cite or circulate.  
 26 
feminist analysis of participation and voice has explored aspects of non-participation and 
silences through the use of counter-factuals – such as what doctrine might look like today 
had excluded groups been allowed to participate.98 Others look to aspects of narrative and 
storytelling to distill ideological biases or other blindspots.99 This section combines two 
distinct approaches to participation, and voice, drawing on the judicial treatment of 
polygamy in Canada, in the chapter by Beverly Baines, and the unwritten memories of a 
leading woman international lawyer, in the chapter by Kim Rubenstein. 
 
Beverly Baines tackles the complex issue of polygamy in her interrogation of the 
implications of gender equality norms, and its impact on notions of participation, agency 
and voice.100 She draws from current Canadian constitutional jurisprudence on polygamy, 
where, as a result of a recent trial court opinion upholding the constitutionality of a law 
criminalizing polygamy on the grounds of harms to women, children, society and 
monogamous marriage,33101 women living in polygamous relationships must face the 
stark (state-imposed) choice: to end their relationships or risk incarceration for up to five 
years.  
 
Leaving aside the question as to why polygamy has been criminalised rather than 
regulated (especially given the rare instances of conviction and the sizeable practice of 
polygamy in certain communities), Baines contends that criminalisation gives Parliament 
a monopoly on the public vilification of polygamy, silencing its dissenters, particularly in 
immigrant Muslim and African as well as Mormon communities in Canada. Baines notes                                                         
98 Karen Knop, ‘The Tokyo Women’s Tribunal and the Turn to Fiction’ 
in Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja (eds),Events: The Force of International 
Law (Routledge, 2011) 145 (describing the project for Japanese women with a counterfactual of 
international law, and noting the efforts to recast past jurisprudence in the Canadian feminist judgments 
project). This method of feminist criticism is also reflected in projects in Australia and the United Kingdom 
and more recently the United States. 
 
99 For seminal references, see Martha Minow, Michael Ryan, and Austin Sarat (eds), Narrative, Violence 
and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover (University of Michigan Press, 1993); Peter Brooks (ed) Law’s 
Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (Yale University Press, 1996). 
 
100 Baines, above n 32. 
 
101 Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada 2011 BCSC 1588 [Polygamy Reference].  
 
Early draft June 1, 2015. Please do note cite or circulate.  
 27 
the same strategy of silencing in the trial opinion itself. In critically assessing the 
evidentiary and legal arguments used in the case, she notes the devaluation – and often 
absence – of the voices of women living in polygamous relationships, including the 
particular experiences of aboriginal, Mormon, and Muslim women. 
 
Baines aims to re-vision the lives of these women, crediting them with agency in 
contradistinction to a victimization narrative. In so doing, she outlines the benefits of a 
sex equality argument, rather than a Charter-based argument for religious freedom, on 
behalf of proponents of polygamy. Noting that gender equality is not an “infinitely 
elastic”102 concept, she suggests however that the law – and indeed, feminism itself – 
may open up space for new – and presently silenced – discourses of separate-but-equal or 
mutual respect justifications for polygamous unions. While these legal arguments may 
not ultimately be successful ones, Baines suggests that the ability to express them at least 
disrupts the victimhood narrative in which such women are now locked. This challenging 
portrayal of gender equality in a stereotypical unequal space is a powerful reminder of the 
flexibilities required of feminism in public law.103  
 
A very different perspective on voice is offered by the focus on the oral history of an elite 
female participant in international lawmaking, by Kim Rubenstein. In her chapter, 
Rubenstein draws from her scholarly investigation into ‘Trailblazing Women and the 
Law’, in particular the life of Erika Feller.104 An Australian national who became the 
Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees within the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR), one of the four top management posts of UNHCR, Erika Feller 
was one of the highest ranking women at UNHCR during her time and it was a position 
                                                        
102 Baines, above n 32, 243. 
 
103 Certainly, the comparative dimensions raised by polygamy in minority and majority cultural 
experiences are worthy of study; see, e.g., Celestine Nyamu Musembi, ‘Pulling Apart? Treatment of 
Pluralism in the CEDAW and the Maputo Protocol’ in Hellum and Sinding Aasen (eds), above n 13, 
183. 
 
104 Rubenstein, above n 39. 
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she held until her retirement in 2013.  Through Feller’s oral history, Rubenstein’s chapter 
considers how gender permeated her life in the domestic and international public spheres. 
 
By directly extracting six segments from this oral history, Rubenstein allows the reader to 
‘hear’ the lived experience of Erika Feller as she herself has chosen to retell it. This 
subtle history opens up new insights into the experience of women who were active and 
involved in questions of human rights, participation, representation, lawmaking, 
leadership and democratisation in the public sphere, both locally and globally. In dealing 
with the particular experiences of a woman who successfully ‘intruded’ upon a domain 
traditionally reserved for men, Rubenstein examines the special individual commitments 
that assisted these early women professionals and leaves open the question as to whether 
these same commitments are those required for later efforts of inclusion. 
 
In recognising the varieties of Erika Feller’s experiences (which will read as deeply 
familiar to some, and distinctively unique to others), Rubenstein argues that by 
concentrating on one oral history we are reminded of the importance of including many 
more oral histories of women from different backgrounds and life experiences in 
institutional archives. This chapter therefore enables us to assess what may be identified 
as gaps in our knowledge of women’s participation that have been absent from the 
institutionalised recordkeeping. Consequently, Rubenstein leaves us with the critical 
question of how the archivesthemselves are sites of power and governance. 
 
PART IV GOVERNANCE, REPRESENTATION AND GENDERED MEASURES 
 
The institutions and processes of public lawmaking are encompassed in the study of 
governance, which has become a ubiquitous framework for both prescription and 
critique. In the following two parts, the interactions between gender and governance are 
analyzed in relation to questions of representation, and questions of equality, 
respectively. First, a long-standing marker of political representation is the number of 
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women in government.105 This quantitative measure has been applied to compare 
particular domestic and regional governments, and to instigate a notion of international 
best practice, with the idea that the involvement of women in representative roles will 
translate their political agendas into policies and laws. Three of the following chapters 
interrogate this marker – including its corollary, quotas – by critiquing notions of 
representation, participation, and indeed their very measurement. This latter critique is 
raised in the fourth chapter, in relation to the highly gendered stakes of poverty 
measurement. 
   
Sharon Bessell’s analysis is sited at both global and local levels, and focuses on the role 
of ideas – world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs – that operate at these 
levels.106 This position allows Bessell to interrogate the puzzle, as to why, with various 
initiatives for women’s political representation, including targets and quotas, women 
continue to occupy so few positions in legislatures around the world. At the global level, 
Bessell notes the conflation of parliamentary representation with the goal of ‘women’s 
empowerment’: a problematic assumption, tied to the ease of measurement and other 
factors. Moreover, Bessell describes the disjuncture between good governance and 
gender equality agendas: the first, primarily neoliberal in orientation, supports initiatives 
that are designed to promote the rule of law, accountability, rights and transparency 
without acknowledging their gendered dimensions; the second, seeking a more radical 
change, contends with less resources and influence.  
 
Despite the global siting of such spaces, each has influence at the national level – in 
particular in the Global South, more dependent on meeting global governance priorities 
and measurements. Bessell’s interrogation of one such space – Malawi – shows how 
locally held ideas of women’s roles in society, in particular in reproductive and 
household domains, continue to be the strongest barriers to representation. 
                                                         
105 See, eg, Mona Lena Krook and Fiona Mackay (eds), Gender, Politics and Institutions (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011); Deborah Cass and Kim Rubenstein, Representation/s of Women in the Australian 
Constitutional System, (1995) 17 Adel. L. Rev. 3. 
106 Bessell, above n 10. 
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Margaret Wilson’s documentation of the engagement of New Zealand women with the 
political process in the period 1970-2008 elicits important dimensions of public law and 
gender equality.107 She finds that electoral reform – in the form of mixed member 
proportional voting – has produced the greatest increase in the formal participation of 
women in the New Zealand parliament.  These electoral reforms – paved against a 
backdrop of an unwritten constitution and a strong culture of political accountability – 
had been a significant part of the women’s movement’s agenda. While the same lack of 
constitutional formality perpetuates the lack of a positive legal right to equality, the 
routes of electoral laws and political party representation – in particular, through the New 
Zealand Labour Party – have not been unproductive for achieving certain reforms, in 
areas such as paid paternity leave and matrimonial property disputes. 
 
Another aspect of Wilson’s study is the focal point provided to women’s groups by 
CEDAW, and the momentum that was created nationally for efforts first to ratify the 
treaty, and then to respond to its reporting requirements. This proved helpful against the 
backdrop of a collapse in cohesion in the women’s movement with the advent of what 
Wilson identifies as cultural feminism, post-modernism and neo-liberalism. The 
continued rise of individualism, the market economy, and the decline of the state 
represent significant challenges.  
 
Huong Nguyen examines gender equality in Vietnam, an ideal that has long been the 
official commitment of Vietnamese government.108 The first Constitution of Vietnam in 
1946 embraced the language of gender equality, well before world trends, as does the 
current 1992 Constitution. Vietnam ratified CEDAW in 1982. The executive issued 
National Strategies for the Advancement of Women in 1997, 2001 and 2011, setting 
ambitious goals toward greater gender equality. The National Assembly, the legislative 
body, enacted the Law on Gender Equality in 2006 and the Law against Domestic 
Violence in 2007.                                                          
107 Margaret Wilson, ‘Women in Government/Governance in New Zealand: A Case Study of Engagement 
over Forty Years’, 296, in this volume. 
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Yet Nguyen’s is not a linear story of progress. The proportion of women in the legislature 
dropped from a third in 1975 to less than a fifth after 1987; a return to such numbers has 
still not been made. Feminism has been a pejorative label, associated with Western 
individualism or the bourgeoisie. Now, the old-fashioned terminology of women’s 
emancipation has shifted, albeit incompletely, to a contemporary (UN sponsored) focus 
on gender mainstreaming, gender equality and women’s rights. These official 
commitments, now with their different focus, continue to be stalled by cultural, 
ideological and cultural constraints. 
 
Beside the problem of the patriarchal culture, Nguyen suggests that the transnational 
concept of gender equality as women’s rights finds itself at odds with the existing 
political ideologies of cultural preservation and national independence projects; gender 
equality has to be advocated within the boundaries of collective goals of nation-building 
and socialism. She argues, in turn, that these obstructions are attributed to the structure of 
power that limits women’s meaningful participation and representation in the socio-
political life and in decision-making bodies where the meaning of gender equality and 
associated rights are defined. Although, in the short term, women’s rights advocates must 
work within the boundaries of the current political system, Nguyen suggests gender 
advocates must work with the democracy movement to secure the preconditions of 
gender equality.  
 
Scott Wisor turns his attention to the modes and techniques of measuring progress in 
securing human rights, with a particular focus on anti-poverty rights. The measurement of 
social progress is a central component of governance – it allows governments to evaluate 
how their programs and policies are working, and citizens to contest how they are 
governed.109 Yet as Wisor demonstrates, poverty measurement as currently practiced is 
largely incapable of revealing gender disparities, despite the known fact that women 
experience far greater levels of poverty and disadvantage.                                                          
109 Scott Wisor, ‘Gender, Justice and Statistics: The Case of Poverty Measurement’, 344, in this volume. 
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Wisor suggests how new measures of poverty may be developed through participatory 
processes that reflect on the values that do and should inform our conception of poverty. 
Noting that procedures of deliberation are at risk of reinforcing gender hierarchies and 
exclusions, he draws on both participatory research and deliberative democratic theory to 
outline a number of exercises to include the voices of those who have been marginalised. 
The variety of techniques that Wisor proposes – including novel uses of weighted 
analyses, vetoes or formal dissents – suggests that robust processes of public reason can 
be critical for poor women and men in the measurement of poverty (a form of 
engagement that Wisor, in collaborative research, has also tested empirically).110 Wisor 
also suggests substantive features of these poverty measures that would allow them to 
reveal gender disparities and concentrate on dimensions of life in which deprivations 
occur that are particularly important for women. This includes interrogating 
intrahousehold distributions of resources and burdens by focusing on the individual, 
collecting an expanded list of information, such as time-use and freedom-from-violence 
indicators, and being sensitive to biological or social difference. He concludes by refuting 
the view that quantitative measurement of rights is bad for justice. 
 
PART V GOVERNANCE, EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 
 
The goals of equality, equal treatment, and non-discrimination are invariably complicated 
in practice. As public law and governance structures have sought to implement such 
goals, they are confounded by the varied background challenges of social norms, 
including with respect to race and gender.111 These chapters, which share many of the 
normative concerns of the preceding parts of this book, especially Part II, illuminate the 
                                                        
110 See Scott Wisor et al., The Individual Deprivation Measure: A Gender-Sensitive Approach to Poverty 
Measurement, https://www.iwda.org.au/introducing-the-individual-deprivation-measure/ (last accessed 22 
June 2015) (eighteen sites of analysis in six countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific). 
 
 
111 See, e.g., Jens Dammann, ‘Place Aux Dames: The Ideological Divide Between US and European 
Gender Discrimination Laws’ (2012) 45 Cornell International Law Journal 25 (suggesting the prominence 
of social and class-based commitments that lead to different substantiations of antidiscrimination laws). 
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various modes of negotiating gender equality, this time in the highly diverse settings of 
indigenous laws in western settler states and in workplace laws and military settings in 
Australia. 
 
Kirsty Gover’s chapter addresses the “perforation” of anti-discrimination regimes, with 
respect to race and gender, and to certain associative exceptions, and the distinctive effect 
of such regimes on the constitution of indigenous communities in western settler 
states.112 In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, indigenous groups are subject to human 
rights and non-discrimination law, and their reliance on descent-based membership 
criteria is susceptible to challenge as a prohibited form of racial discrimination. In the 
public law of these liberal democracies, racial discrimination is subject to a much more 
comprehensive prohibition than gender discrimination.   
 
Gover points out that while non-discrimination legislation contains numerous exceptions 
allowing named groups to discriminate in their membership criteria on the basis of 
gender, there are no exceptions that expressly permit groups to discriminate on the basis 
of race. Consequently, tribes do not benefit from express exceptions in non-
discrimination legislation allowing certain “private” organizations to self-constitute in 
ways that would otherwise be unlawful. Yet, as Gover convincingly argues, in liberal 
settler democracies, the distinctive constitutional status of indigenous individuals and 
groups is legitimately premised on the legal concept of race.  Gover turns to the reasoning 
deployed for two justified discriminations in Canadian and United Kingdom law – of 
permitting gender-based exclusions from a single-sex club, and of permitting religious-
based exceptions for racial (descent-based) membership – to suggest that the 
justifications supporting the exception of families, households, subscriptive associations 
and religious organizations from non-discrimination law should also support exceptions 
for indigenous peoples as “racially constituted” groups. 
 
Dominique Allen sets out to reassess the model of promoting gender equality in                                                         
112 Gover, above n 38. 
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Australia, which she suggests is still partially locked in formal equality, anti-
discrimination, and equality of opportunity frameworks.113 She proposes instead two 
levels from which to think about promoting equality. The first is through anti-
discrimination statutes that provide women who have experienced discrimination, 
whether in the workplace or elsewhere, with redress. The second level is through laws 
that are designed to promote equality such as a constitutional protection of equality, 
affirmative action measures and other proactive measures. The Australian Constitution 
contains no express guarantee of equality, and so Allen’s analysis proceeds along 
statutory lines. Irrespective of what public law models are followed, however, she 
demonstrates how a formal model of equality can defeat substantive equality outcomes.  
 
By examining the outcomes around Australia’s sex discrimination laws, Allen is able to 
provide an overview critique of the problems of narrow enforcement, disincentives, and 
non-systemic redress. This leads her to propose reforms for improving anti-
discrimination laws, by reforming the individual complaints model. At a different level of 
reform, however, Allen suggests a proactive approach to gender equality, which would 
abandon the remedial frame in order to broach a more positive duty to promote gender 
equality. This includes aspects of affirmative action (but not quotas), an equality impact 
assessment tool, and a legislated duty to fulfill positive gender equality, borrowed from 
United Kingdom public law.  
   
Susan Harris Rimmer’s chapter also proceeds along comparative and international lines 
with a critique of the current public laws engaging gender in the Australian military. She 
turns her attention to the ‘hyper-masculinist’ institution of the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF).114 Acknowledging the special public law role of the military, Harris Rimmer 
examines the general requirement of equal treatment of men and women in the Australian 
context, apart from a limited exception for combat activities. Rather than focus on this 
exception (although noting its relationship to her focus on women’s rights), Harris                                                         
113 Allen, above n 38. 
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Rimmer is concerned with the practices of gender-based abuse of both women and men 
that have occurred in the ADF, and the inadequate internal responses that have been 
followed. Pressure to address these incidents has arisen in Australia and in other western 
militaries.  
 
With this concern in mind, Harris Rimmer suggests that Australia’s Parliament should 
mandate that gender equality is fundamental to achieving the mission of the ADF as a 
foundational Australian public institution.  Adopting an incremental, policy-making 
perspective, she proposes that international and comparative law can intersect with and 
influence military law and policy to improve gender equality within the ADF and 
improve the community impacts of ADF operations overseas. Her proposal is therefore 
based on particular international resolutions directed to gender equality, and to certain 
comparative examples from Germany and the United Kingdom. Harris Rimmer argues 
that if this legal intersection does not occur, the ADF will continue to respond to gender 
abuse in an ad hoc manner laboring under what she terms the 'rotten apple delusion' and 
'wait out' reformist impulses. She concludes that the ADF should embrace parliamentary 
scrutiny and monitoring and should increase the number of women in its ranks.  
 
PART VI GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE PRECEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW 
 
This last section concludes the public and international law theme by bringing together 
four chapters highlighting the public law tensions for gender equality in the practice of 
global governance. These chapters examine where, how and/or why international 
institutions have evolved, if at all, to take gendered issues into account. They encompass 
the processes of the CEDAW Committee, the International Labour Organization, the 
International Criminal Court and the UN Conference on Sustainable Development. A 
more expansive assessment of global administrative law is made in dealing explicitly 
with the question of gender variance. 
 
In a companion chapter to her first chapter in Part I (Feminisms and Constitutions), 
Jackson extends her analysis to the relationship between constitutions and international 
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and transnational sources of law.115 In particular, Jackson argues for a posture of 
engagement between the two bodies of law, and analyses the potential of this approach 
for implementing CEDAW. As Jackson notes, there are reasonable but competing 
conceptions of how to advance gender equality through law, and recognition of this 
pluralism has implications, both for the practice of international organisations such as the 
CEDAW Committee, as well as the treatment of international law by domestic courts and 
other parts of government.  
 
In testing this theory, Jackson puts CEDAW’s monitoring activity under examination, 
including its approach to laws requiring gender neutrality in Finland, laws addressing 
sexual violence and prostitution in Iceland, and the Committee’s preference for equality 
rather than equity measures in Mexico: for each, Jackson recommends a more open, and 
less uniform, position. In emphasizing the ideas of feminist pluralism, constitutional 
diversity, and epistemological humility, she concludes that a diversity of national 
practices aimed at increasing gender equality, rather than international uniformity, are 
more likely to advance women’s equality.  
 
Louise Chappell draws on a feminist variant of ‘new institutionalism’, which provides an 
important analytical lens for understanding gender justice across the formal and informal 
institutions of global governance.116 In introducing this standpoint, Chappell focuses on 
the role of the Registry of the International Criminal Court (‘the ICC’), the core 
governance organ of the ICC, in its first ten years of operation. In particular, Chappell 
analyses the Registry’s efforts to advance gender justice especially through the protection 
of victims and witnesses of sexually based violence and its sensitivity to gender issues in 
the development of the ICC’s outreach programs.  
 
The formal recognition of gender justice within the Rome Statute for the ICC was the 
result of concerted feminist legal advocacy, and has helped to orient the Registry towards                                                         
115 Jackson, above n 58. 
 
116 Chappell, above n 28. 
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a gender-just, victim-centered, framework. Despite this achievement, however, Chappell 
argues that a set of compounding institutional problems frustrate this effort. These 
include limitations of the formal rules, scarce resources as well as the conflict between 
these new rules with older, and informal gender rules that interfere with efforts to address 
the claims of sexual violence victims, both male and female. Chappell concludes that the 
ongoing challenge for ICC insiders and those in civil society who are seeking more just 
gender outcomes is to find ways to circumvent ‘old’ gender norms and expectations so 
that ‘new’ gender justice rules can be instituted. 
  
Turning to the administration of international organizations more generally, Osmat 
Jefferson and Innokenti Epichev set out to measure the accountability of international 
organizations (IOs) in the employment setting, with a particular focus on gender 
issues.117 As they note, two tiers of safeguards protect individual employment: the 
internal and informal dispute resolution mechanisms, which are said to resolve 90% of 
individual disputes, and the quasi-judicial or formal one, in which the remaining 10% are 
processed and resolved by an administrative tribunal that is the ultimate court of appeal 
for employees of IOs after all internal means are exhausted.  
 
In order to evaluate IO employer accountability in such general terms, Jefferson and 
Epichev examine common patterns of practices across diverse organizations through the 
lens of administrative tribunal judgments for complaints initiated by staff from these 
organizations between 2009 and 2012. In particular, they focus on the International 
Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal, which administers complaints from 59 
IOs. They suggest that rules governing the mandate, composition and procedures of this 
tribunal are problematic from both an administrative law and human rights perspective; 
and note wide gaps in access to the tribunal and problems of due process and 
transparency. Disaggregating their analysis on the basis of both the nationality and 
gender of complainants, their data points to major lapses in accountability in the hiring 
and selection processes, pension compensation, medical leave, insurance, and (most                                                         
117 Osmat Jefferson and Innokenti Epichev, ‘International Organisations as Employers: Searching for 
Practices of Fair Treatment and Due Process Rights of Staff’, 489, in this volume. 
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overwhelmingly relevant, they find, for female complainants) unfair treatment and sexual 
harassment claims, in international organizations.  
 
Rohan Kapur and Kellin Kristofferson extend the theme of administrative deficiencies by 
adopting the frame of global administrative law.118 In this vein, they note that the 
emergence of transgovernmental systems of regulation may evade the control of national 
governments, domestic legal systems, or in the case of treaty-based regimes, the states 
parties to the treaty. One danger of this accountability deficit is that cultures of inequity, 
such as gender, become entrenched on a global scale.  
 
Kapur and Kristofferson’s chapter deals explicitly with one aspect of gender injustice and 
oppression: the experience of gender-variant persons. In this context, they investigate 
which mechanisms constrain or render accountable the activities of international 
regulatory bodies, focusing specifically on the gender inequities that may by rectified, 
avoided, or exacerbated by these mechanisms. In doing so, they draw on hard and soft 
models of accountability for international organisations. Taking an approach that they 
term as an ‘explicit post-woman feminism’, they highlight the experience of gender-
variant persons as a compelling instance of gender oppression, and use this lens to 
identify instances where gender inequalities are supported or promulgated by economic 
and administrative processes, and by the cultural perceptions on which those processes 
are founded. This analysis is presented using four key administrative principles: 
visibility; opportunity to participate; active and passive oppression; and, interest 
recognition. 
 
   
In the final chapter of this part, Kate Wilkinson utilizes the epistemological frame of 
‘ecofeminism’ in order to evaluate the most recent developments in international 
environmental law.119  In particular, Wilkinson examines how the Outcome Document                                                         
118 Kapur and Kristofferson, above n 29. 
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from the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, published in 2012, integrates 
concerns relating to ‘gender’. With this focus, Wilkinson examines the political 
participation and decision making by women’s and other groups at the UN Conference 
(such as the Women’s Major Group and Indigenous Peoples’ Major Group), who were 
permitted access to the preparatory process. 
 
Despite this unprecedented access, and the numerous references to gender equality, 
women’s empowerment, and the “welfare of women” that have been included, Wilkinson 
deploys an ecofeminist critique to suggest that the ability of the Outcome Document to 
challenge current gendered (and ecosystem) inequalities has been limited. In particular, 
Wilkinson suggests that the presentation of a “green economy” has assimilated women 
and other marginalized groups into the dominant and andocentric project of “sustainable 
development”, and its current privileging of neoliberal political economy. For example, 
projects to “empower” women continue to devalue their work in the household, in the 
informal economy, and the “repetitive, local, necessary, communal and embedded [work] 
in the local ecosystem”.120 It is a fitting conclusion to the book’s themes of how the 
public law of gender is constituted, coopted, and maintained across local and global sites 
of action.  
Conclusion 
 
This is the concluding volume of a six part series121 that has sought to broaden the 
scholarship on the ways public law and international law intersects. Its collective                                                         
120 Ibid, 556 fn 115, citing Mary Mellor, ‘Ecofeminist Political Economy’ (2006) 1 International Journal of 
Green Economics 139, 140. 
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message further emphasises that looking beyond the question of how international and 
public law overlap or beyond how international law is implemented domestically 
provides us with richer and more fluid frames to think through areas of profound 
significance.  Concluding this series with the theme of gender has enabled us to not only 
consciously bring together public and international lawyers, political scientists, 
philosophers, psychologists, and specialists of gender studies, to consider and engage in 
each others’ scholarship, but also to critically examine the contemporary construction and 
dissemination of this emerging public law field.  
 
By utilizing a focus on gender in public law, we have identified an apparently 
extraordinary moment of national and transnational feminist influence in the public 
sphere; coming at the very moment of widespread diminishment of that sphere via 
contemporaneous constitutional and governance reforms.122 For the reasons given in 
these chapters, the question remains as to whether the gender cognizant laws of non-
discrimination, affirmative measures for legislative representation, and other equality-
based initiatives, as well as more facially neutral liberal democratic and judicial reforms, 
will deliver the positive outcomes that gender advocates have so vigorously sought.   
 
Certainly, the triad of reasons for the gaps identified between formal law’s promises and 
its reality – which I have explained in terms of lapses in enforcement, sincerity and 
coverage – apply across local, national and transnational domains. Yet many of the 
chapters of this volume problematise each category. The chapters of Parts I and VIshow 
how the structures of domestic and especially international law point to the challenge of 
enforcement: that, for example, it is a lack of enforcement that has allowed gender-
discriminatory laws to continue in the United States or CEDAW recommendations to go 
unaddressed. Yet these chapters are not unified in their prescriptions for addressing this 
lapse of enforcement: while one describes how the very ambiguity of enforcement can 
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suppress challenges to gender inequality, another suggests that it may, contrariwise, 
sustain a more pluralist basis for such challenges over the long term.123 
 
Amongst the other parts of the book, however, it is striking how lapses in enforcement 
are much less part of the problem, and how the challenges of coverage and sincerity 
become less easy to separate. For example, the chapters of Part II, dealing with local 
custom, and Parts IV and V, dealing with governance, inform our understanding of the 
problem of coverage, especially in the way that they point to the perpetuation of gendered 
roles within the private spheres that are left untouched by international or public laws 
(despite the private law–piercing aims of CEDAW, or of the horizontality of 
constitutional law, or of the ambitions of the ‘global governance’ programme124). 
 
Yet here the lapses of coverage appear to blend with those of sincerity. Across both local 
and global sites of analysis, the documented endeavours for gender neutrality and gender 
equality in law seem to founder on an antipathy to the lived experience of gender 
disadvantage. While questioning the sincerity of lawmakers is too simplistic an overlay to 
the complex descriptions of law and gender within this volume – even as the gendered 
composition of those lawmakers is made clear, as is most highlighted in Parts 
III and IV – the question does provide a timely warning that calls for a feminist pluralism 
do not provide cover for further (antifeminist) insincerity.125 
 
Thus, there is no single, neat message that concludes this volume. Nonetheless, we hope 
that it has opened up a research agenda that builds upon both the literatures of feminist 
constitutionalism and feminist approaches to international law and the common insights                                                         
123 Compare Collins, above n 16, with Jackson, above n 16. 
 
124 Representative here is, for example, Bessell, above n 10. 
 
125 For the documentation of the compromises made by local and international organisations in approaching 
questions of gender, see Bina D’Costa, ‘“You Cannot Hold Two Watermelons in One Hand”: Gender 
Justice and Anti-State Local Security Institutions in Pakistan and Afghanistan’, in Nasu and Rubenstein 
(eds), above n 125, 47, 52(noting that ‘many projects claiming to be gender sensitive are not only explicitly 
un-feminist but are gender biased. As such, while feminist projects are gender sensitive, not all gender 
projects are necessarily feminist’). 
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of each. We find several questions particularly suggestive in the current globalised 
setting. For example, we have not foregrounded economic and social rights, despite the 
attention of several chapters to the critically gendered nature of poverty126 and the 
attempts made in international human rights law and in comparative constitutional law to 
address material deprivation in terms of rights.127 This rapidly changing area of law, 
which allows for an implicit targeting of particularly disadvantaged groups (an 
implicitness which can be a key to the political success of public policy and public law), 
is critically important for addressing gender-relevant inequality.128 Second, we have 
noted the role of religion in our book, analysing the gender-discriminatory aspects of 
religious rules in the same space as cultural or customary rules. Nonetheless, due to the 
hold of religious ideas in public spaces, a future study could attend to the challenge of 
minority and majority religions across public laws. What is it that connects the gender-
based parental roles that have been used to court the Christian right in U.S. politics129and 
the intractability of modesty and chastity-requisite gender roles in Indian courts?130 
 
A related example comes from the intersections of gender and security concerns. Indeed, 
while religion and security are connected (in the debates, for example, between 
fundamentalism and Islamism), it is worth setting out a clear study on these relations and 
how security-based interventions may further or diminish the cause of gender                                                         
126 See especially Lemaitre and Sandvik, above n 33, 99; Wisor, above n 114, 344. 
 
127 See generally Katharine G Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 2012); compare findings of Lambert and Scribner, above n 2, 
with Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl and Evan Rosevear, ‘Economic and Social Rights in National 
Constitutions’ 62 (2014) American Journal of Comparative Law 1043. For qualitative, single-country 
analysis, see Beth Goldblatt and Kirsty McLean (eds), Women’s Social and Economic Rights: 
Developments in South Africa(Springer, 2011). 
 
 
128 Young, above n 131, 97 (noting Theda Skocpol’s prescription for ‘helping the poor by not talking about 
them’: ‘Targeting with Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States’ in 
Christopher Jencks and Paul E Peterson [eds], The Urban Underclass [Brookings Institution, 1991] 411). 
 
129 Collins, above n 16. 
 
130 See, e.g., Daphne Barak-Erez and Jayna Kothari, ‘When Sexual Harassment Law Goes East: Feminism, 
Legal Transplantation, and Social Change’ (2011) 47 Stanford Journal of International Law 175, 190–1 
(courts protecting only the ‘pure’ victim). 
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equality.131 Finally, a rich set of questions arises from the chapter on gender-variance: 
with the growing appreciation of transgender rights, we must assess the benefits of a 
gender-specific approach, exemplified by CEDAW’s focus on women,132 and its 
solidarities and tensions with other humanist goals. For example, the burden of gender 
stereotypes extends beyond the male/female binary of men and women, to ‘differently 
sexed’ (intersex, transgender) people and people with a ‘different sexuality’ (gay, lesbian 
and bisexual people).133 The different characterisations of this burden require 
examination both conceptually and comparatively. 
 
We raise these questions as an invitation for further analysis, but note that many other 
causal, normative or conceptual questions in this field surface when one’s frame is a 
globalised and comparative one. The public law of gender is rapidly evolving and, in 
drawing attention to local and global perspectives, we invite our readers to learn from 
both the successes and failures of the insistence on gender as a category of legal study. 
 
  
                                                        
131 E.g., D’Costa, above n 129, 47; see also Otto, above n 66, 100; Ní Aoláin et al., above n 92, ch 3. 
 
132 Compare generally Hellum and Sinding Aasen (eds), above n 13, with Rosenblum, above n 26; see 
also DavidBrown, ‘Making Room for Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in International Human 
Rights Law: An Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles’ (2010) 31 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 822 
 
133 Rikki Holtmaat, ‘The CEDAW: A Holistic Approach to Women’s Equality and Freedom’ in Hellum and 
Sinding Aasen (eds), above n 13, 95, 115; see also William Eskridge, ‘Sexual and Gender Variation in 
American Public Law: From Malignant to Benign to Productive’ (2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1333.  
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